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LIST OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES 
Plaintiffs/Appellees consist of one-hundred and twenty-four (124) sworn law 
enforcement officers (hereinafter the "Sworn Officers") that were employed by the Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs Office (the "Sheriffs Office") during all or a portion of the period from May 1, 
1990 to August 31, 1994. Ninety-two (92) of the Sworn Officers received a back pay award 
from the trial court. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(1), the following is a 
complete listing, by name, of all of the Sworn Officers who were parties below: 
A. Identity of 92 Prevailing Sworn Officers and their Base Inequity Awards: 
NAME 
Jolyn Ackley 
Vaughn Allen 
Susan Bailess 
Henry Beltran 
Benn Blackmer 
David Burdett 
Perry Buckner 
Craig Carroll 
Mark Chidester 
GaryCummings 
Robert Damewood 
Bruce Davies 
Jack Dwyer 
Vaughn Delahunty 
Jim Everett 
BASE INEQUITY AWARD 
$480.00 
$144.00 
$1,334.00 
$560.00 
$4,268.00 
$11,960.00 
$12,240.00 
$15,592.00 
$15,848.00 
$16,440.00 
$5,992.00 
$3,464.00 
$960.00 
$14,612.00 
$20,416.00 
Kenneth Eyre 
James Farrington 
Paul Fleming 
Donald Gamer 
Armand Glick 
Wallace Gray 
Howard Green 
Stephen Grogan 
Ross Guest 
Phillip Haslam 
Brad Harmon 
Kent Harrison 
Donald Hicken 
Michael Hill 
Lori Housekeeper 
Shane Hudson 
Jefferson Itami 
Duane Jensen 
Kevin Judd 
Dan Kavanaugh 
Leigh Killpack 
Don Kirk 
Michael Lambrose 
Steven Larsen 
Kerry Lindgren 
Michael Lloyd 
$15,848.00 
$960.00 
$5,112.00 
$3,696.00 
$8,976.00 
$5,488.00 
$704.00 
$10,600.00 
$672.00 
$2,568.00 
$16,416.00 
$20,096.00 
$512.00 
$16,416.00 
$1,092.00 
$7,888.00 
$11,672.00 1 
$9,200.00 1 
$14,680.00 
$1,888.00 1 
$10,416.00 1 
$11,792.00 1 
$576.00 1 
$15,000.00 1 
$7,532.00 
$15,848.00 
Jeffrey Lone 
Frank Lucero 
Mike Lynch 
Paul Maxwell 
Gregory McArthur 
Kay McDonald 
Scott McMahon 
Scott Miller 
Robert Mitchell 
Kenneth Moeller 
TroyNaylor 
Rex Nelson 
MarkNielson 
Kris Ownby 
Lesley Parker 
Reed Parkin 
Brian Patrick 
Kenneth Patrick 
Scott Perry 
Marc Peterson 
Michael Quintana 
R. Michael Ricketts 
Mark Robbins 
Thomas Russell 
Ernest Russo 
Hector W. Sartor, Jr. 
$12,232.00 
$3,704.00 
$8,952.00 
$11,960.00 
$560.00 
$3,800.00 
$8,384.00 
$12,944.00 
$12,240.00 
$3,000.00 
$14,592.00 
$1,344.00 
$9,696.00 1 
$13,048.00 
$576.00 
$8,976.00 1 
$24.00 
$12,240.00 1 
$8,952.00 
$5,116.00 1 
$5,768.00 
$15,856.00 
$8,936.00 
$9,696.00 
$10,560.00 
$1,896.00 
Blake Schroeder 
Steve Sharp 
1 Kevin Sheffield 
1 Chad Soffe 
Allen Spencer 
Larry Stratford 
Keith Stephens 
Gary Sterner 
John Stowe 
Andrew Swenson 
John Taylor 
Kevin Taylor 
Brian Thomas 
Danny Troester 
James Upton 
Darrell Van Cott 
Eugene Vanroosendahl 
Charles Waldo 
Doug Walters 
Karen Werner 
Craig Watson 
Jeffery West 
Lonnie Wilson 
David Winters 
Brent Young 
$18,960.00 
$2,784.00 
$16,416.00 
$992.00 
$6,776.00 
$15,208.00 
$9,280.00 
$8,480.00 
$8,976.00 
$560.00 
$6,584.00 
$5,280.00 
$18,556.00 
$7,888.00 
$9,536.00 
$16,416.00 
$1,056.00 
$1,244.00 1 
$5,256.00 1 
$5,328.00 1 
$7,888.00 1 
$8,936.00 1 
$12,320.00 
$1,056.00 
$1,056.00 
Identity of 32 Sworn Officers who did not Receive a Back Pay Award: 
Kathy Aiken; 
Evelyn Ball; 
Jack Barfield; 
Scott Bell; 
Kim Bowman; 
Randy Brown; 
Lamont Christensen; 
Troy Dial; 
John Ells; 
Annick English; 
Grant English; 
Ralph Fisher; 
Peter Godfrey; 
Gary Haddock; 
Kendra Herlin; 
Ron Huber; 
Avery Housekeeper; 
Ronald Latham; 
Kenton Mattingly; 
Michael Mitchell; 
David Mortensen; 
John Merrick; 
Don Rissinger; 
Wayne Shipaanboord; 
Dave Shoepp; 
Charles Skogg; 
Bruce Sterner; 
Tom Stanten; 
Scott Van Wagonen; 
Rocky Finnochio; 
Vern Beesley; and 
John Bell 
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JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final judgment awarding 92l of the Sworn Officers 
back pay, overtime and retirement benefits from Defendant/Appellant Salt Lake County 
(the "County") in a civil action after the conclusion of a bench trial. This case also 
involves an appeal from various interlocutory orders that were entered prior to and after 
the entry of the final judgment. The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, judge of the Utah 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, entered a final judgment in favor of the Sworn 
Officers on January 25, 2002 (R. 4015-4023), and then entered a supplemental order on 
March 13, 2002. (R. 4120-4126). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Article 8, § 3 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court correctly enter partial summary judgment in favor of the 
Sworn Officers and against the County, finding and holding that the rulings of the 
arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit were controlling in this Lawsuit under principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel, and therefore that (1) all of the County's defenses were 
barred, and (2) the Sworn Officers were entitled to present their back pay claims to the 
trial court using the arbitrator's back pay formula? Because the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment "presents questions of law," this Court reviews the ruling for 
"correctness." In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 
P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
1
 The trial court determined that 32 of the 124 Sworn Officers had "failed to 
establish that they are entitled to a back pay award under the rulings and decisions that 
were made by the arbitrator in the Diamant case." (R. 4021). The 32 Sworn Officers 
who did not receive a back pay award from the trial court have not appealed, and the trial 
court's judgment concerning them is final and non-appealable. 
this Court determine[s] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law 
and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material 
fact." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, whether res judicata or collateral estoppel 
applies in a case is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Macris & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, 2000 UT 93, 1fl7, 16 P.3d 1214. 
B. Was the trial court correct in concluding that the proper statute of 
limitations to apply to the Sworn Officers' equitable claims for back pay was May 1, 
1990 through August 31, 1994, which was the same limitations period applied by the 
arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit? Whether res judicata or collateral applies in a case is 
a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. IcL Moreover, the correct statute of 
limitations to apply in a case also is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C., 2000 UT 84, [^10, 12 P.3d 577. 
C. Was the statute of limitations continuously tolled until this Lawsuit was 
filed in as much as the Diamant Lawsuit was filed as a class action and there was never 
an order denying class certification in that case? Whether a statute of limitations has 
been tolled is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Klinger v. 
Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990). 
D. Were the Sworn Officers' equitable claims for back pay subject to the 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, including but not limited to the 
requirement that a notice of claim be filed prior to filing suit and, if they were, were the 
notice of claim requirements met in this case? The interpretation of the Governmental 
Immunity Act is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Maddocks v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1987). 
E. Did the trial court correctly award the prevailing Sworn Officers 
prejudgment interest on their back pay awards, where the amount due to each Sworn 
Officer was fixed as of September 1, 1994, the amount due could be measured by facts 
and figures, and in fact the amount due was stipulated to by the County? "A trial court's 
decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which [this 
Court reviews] for correctness." Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
While no statutes are determinative in this matter, there are several statutes that are 
or may be relevant to the issues in dispute. They are (a) Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-5, 
which required, among other things, that the County establish a Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission to "formulate a comprehensive job classification plan covering all peace 
officers" of the County, and that the plan "place all positions requiring substantially the 
same duties and qualifications in the same classification," (b) Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-
5(3)(b), which required, among other things, that the County establish an office of 
personnel management to develop personnel rules for the County providing for certain 
factors to be taken into consideration when making personnel decisions, and (c) various 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. Each 
of these statutory provisions is reproduced in full in the Addendum to the County's brief, 
and therefore they are not reproduced here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit is about the County's decision to pay the Sworn Officers unlawfully 
and inequitably between May 1, 1990 and August 31, 1994, and whether the Sworn 
Officers are entitled to be compensated for that inequity on the same terms as their 
compatriots who were specifically named in the Diamant Lawsuit. The County suggests 
that even though it litigated and lost the same "equal pay" issues in the Diamant Lawsuit, 
even though it promised to treat the Sworn Officers the same as those employees who 
were specifically named in the Diamant Lawsuit, and even though Utah law and the 
County's policies prohibited the County from paying the Sworn Officers inequitably 
during the relevant time period, the Sworn Officers have no cognizable claims for back 
pay. Rather, the County argues that the Sworn Officers are out of luck, and must live 
with the unequal treatment they received, for a whole host of reasons. 
The trial court, of course, saw it much differently. After reviewing the undisputed 
evidence that was submitted to it, the trial court correctly waded through the numerous 
"smoke screens" that the County raised in an effort to obfuscate and confuse the real 
issues in this case, and entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Sworn Officers. 
The trial court's partial summary judgment, however, did nothing more and nothing less 
than require the parties to apply the rulings made by the arbitrator in the Diamant 
Lawsuit in this case. In particular, the trial court directed the parties to apply the exact 
same limitations period and the exact same formula that was adopted by the arbitrator in 
the Diamant Lawsuit to the back pay claims of the Sworn Officers in this Lawsuit. The 
result of that exercise was not surprising. Applying the formula, the parties were able to 
agree on the back pay amounts (if any) that were to be awarded to 110 of the 124 Sworn 
Officers who asserted claims in this case. The parties were only required to try the back 
pay claims of 14 of the Sworn Officers, and the trial focused on whether, given each 
particular Sworn Officer's factual situation, the Sworn Officer was entitled to back pay. 
After the trial concluded (with the County winning some of the arguments and the Sworn 
Officers winning some of the arguments), the parties stipulated to the amount of back pay 
awards for the remaining 14 Sworn Officers. The trial court then ordered the County to 
pay prejudgment interest on those awards, and to also pay any additional retirement and 
overtime benefits that the prevailing Sworn Officers were entitled to receive. The County 
then filed this appeal, and asked the trial court to stay enforcement of its rulings. The 
trial court granted the County's request, and the trial court5s judgment remains unpaid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. THE PAY EQUITY COMMITTEE AND THE FILING OF THE 
DIAMANT LAWSUIT. 
At all material times, Utah law and the County's employment policies required 
that all sworn employees of the Sheriffs Office, including the Sworn Officers, be paid 
equitably. (County's Brief at 6-7, R. 2188-2203 & 2212-2214). In April of 1991, a Pay 
Equity Committee that was formed by the County for the express purpose of resolving 
pay equity issues in the Sheriffs Office issued a detailed written report concerning the 
pay inequities that were then occurring at the Sheriffs Office. (R. 2528-2569). In the 
written report, the Pay Equity Committee identified its goals and objectives as follows: 
A. "Develop a working definition of pay inequity" (R. 2530); 
B. "Identify the sources of pay inequity" (Id.); 
C. "Gather and analyze data bearing on pay inequity" (Id.); 
D. "Develop proposals designed to remedy pay inequities" (Id.); 
E. "Identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal including 
costs" (Id.); and 
F. "Develop suggestions to prevent or minimize the occurrence of pay 
inequities in the future." (Id.). 
The Pay Equity Committee initially defined a pay inequity as a "gross unjustified 
discrepancy in salary/' and then identified six different sources for the pay inequity that 
was then occurring at the Sheriffs Office. (Id.) Those six sources were as follows: 
A. "The abandonment of February/August merit date and adopting the 
employee's hire date as the new date for awarding merit beginning in 1990" (Id.); 
B. "Failure to fund merit in some years" (R. 2531); 
C. "The level of merit pay has differed from year to year" (Id.); 
D. "A structural (cost-of-living) increase given to new employees but denied 
to those with service" (Id.); 
E. "Timing of six month probationary increase" (Id.); and 
F. "Giving extra pay for employees with prior P.O.S.T. experience (1 for 2 
formula) when the extra merit pay exceeded the merit pay given to employees for the 
period of time for which the credit was given." (R. 2532). 
Finally, the Pay Equity Committee made recommendations to the County 
concerning its pay inequity problems, with the hope that the proposals "if implemented, 
will significantly minimize the pay inequities that currently exist within every rank in the 
office." (R. 2542). The Pay Equity Committee also recommended that the County's 
policies be amended to define a pay inequity as "a situation of gross unfairness, such as a 
longer term employee being paid less than a shorter term employee of the same grade and 
rank and performance level." (Id.). 
On April 30, 1991, and in response to the findings of the Pay Equity Committee, 
Kathryn Diamant ("Officer Diamant") and Leslee Collins ("Officer Collins"), two 
sworn employees of the Sheriffs Office, filed a notice of claim with the County 
concerning the various issues raised by the Pay Equity Committee. (R. 4176, second 
"Tab B"). The notice of claim was filed individually "and on behalf of all persons 
similarly situated in Salt Lake County government/' and alleged among other things that 
the County had violated "U.C.A. 17-33-1, et seq." by virtue of its inequitable payment 
practices. (Id.). 
On March 24, 1992, Officers Diamant and Collins filed suit in the Utah Third 
District Court against the County, Sheriff Aaron Kennard, and the Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, Civil Number 9209015649, concerning the same issues that were raised 
in their notice of claim (hereinafter the "Diamant Lawsuit"). (R. 2970-2981). The 
Diamant Lawsuit was filed as a class action on behalf of the named plaintiffs "and all 
persons similarly situated in Salt Lake County government." (Id.). As in this case, the 
Diamant Lawsuit concerned the issue of unequal pay, and demanded back pay as a 
remedy. (Id.). Additionally, the Diamant complaint explicitly referenced Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-33-5 in the first cause of action. (R. 2972). 
The Diamant Lawsuit was assigned to the Honorable David Young for decision. 
In the Diamant Lawsuit, the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-5 to the pay equity 
claims asserted therein was raised by the County in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In 
essence, the County argued that the Diamant plaintiffs could not state a cause of action 
under that statute. (R. 4176, Tab "D"). The County's motion was denied. (R. 4176, Tab 
"E"). After the County's motion was denied, the County filed an answer to the Diamant 
complaint. In its answer, the County raised the following defenses, among others: 
A. That the pay equity claims asserted therein failed to state a claim upon 
2
 If there were doubt that the Diamant Lawsuit was filed as a class action, 
one need look no further than page 12 of the complaint. There, Officers Diamant and 
Collins signed a statement under oath, and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), consenting to 
be party plaintiffs in the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be 
maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of 
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. . ..") (emphasis supplied). 
which relief could be granted (R. 4176, Tab "F"); 
B. That the pay equity claims asserted therein were "not timely" and were 
"barred by the statute of limitations" (Id.); 
C. That the pay equity claims asserted therein were "barred by the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1 et seq." (Id.); 
D. That "[a]ll decisions complained of by Plaintiffs . . . were discretionary and 
part of the legislative function of the Defendants" (Id.); and 
E. That "all actions taken by the Defendants herein were legislative in nature 
and legitimate business decisions intended to provide a stable working environment and 
promote greater efficiency for Salt Lake County." (Id.). 
In discovery responses it filed in the Diamant Lawsuit, the County further 
explained its defense to the pay equity claims asserted therein as follows: 
The Plaintiffs assert that they have a Pay Inequity Claim 
based upon Section 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii) of the County 
Personnel Management Act. The Defendants have asserted 
that the County Personnel Management Act is not applicable 
because of the Deputy Sheriff Merit System Act, 17-30-1, 
U.C.A. (R. 4176, first Tab "G").3 
In March of 1994, the parties in the Diamant Lawsuit stipulated to a dismissal of 
the lawsuit with prejudice, and submitted the dispute to binding arbitration. (R. 3358-
3359). The parties agreed that "any decision by the Arbitrator [would] be final and 
binding" on the parties. (R. 3359). The issue of whether the Diamant Lawsuit should 
proceed as a class action was never decided by Judge Young. After the Diamant Lawsuit 
was referred to binding arbitration, the County filed a Motion to Bifurcate. In that 
3
 The County also claimed that it was immune from suit under the Governmental 
Immunity Act, and that the claims in the Diamant Lawsuit were barred by the 
governmental functions doctrine. (R. 4176, first Tab "G"). 
motion, the County asserted that the pay equity claims asserted therein were governed by 
a one-year statute of limitation: 
Respondent asserts that the appropriate time frame for 
looking at the back pay issue raised by the Grievants in this 
matter starts in April, 1991 [or one year prior to the filing of 
the Diamant Lawsuit], and proceeds to the present. (R. 4176, 
Tab "H"). 
After the Diamant Lawsuit was referred to binding arbitration, the parties also 
actively litigated the question of whether the pay equity claims asserted therein were 
equitable claims, and whether the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
applied to equitable claims. (R. 4176, Tab "I"). The arbitrator eventually determined 
that the limitations period for the plaintiffs' back pay claims would run from May 1, 1990 
until September 1, 1994, when all sources of pay inequity were removed. (R. 2782). 
Thereafter, in February of 1996, the parties in the Diamant Lawsuit filed cross 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 4176, Tabs "K" and "L"). In its motion, the County 
argued that its policies and procedures concerning pay equity were "general policy 
statements" that did not give rise to a claim for back pay, that its policy of giving credit 
for outside law enforcement work did not violate the County's policies and procedures, 
and that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a gross unfairness with respect to their pay 
so as to constitute a circumstance of pay inequity. (Id.). 
On August 15, 1996, the arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit rejected all of the 
County's arguments and defenses, and ruled that the following formula would be used in 
deciding any pay equity claim that was placed before him: 
A comparison shall be made between the grievant's monthly 
salary and the comparable's monthly salary at the following 
points in time: May 1, 1990, December 1991, December 
1992, December 1993, August 1994. The difference between 
the comparable's monthly salary and the grievant's monthly 
salary at each of the foregoing points in time shall then be 
utilized to calculate the grievant's inequity for each of the 
respective years. (R. 4176, Tab "M"). 
Thereafter, on November 27, 1996, the arbitrator issued his Final Order of 
Arbitrator (the "Final Order"). (R. 2776-2778). The caption of the Final Order 
provided that it was for the benefit of the named plaintiffs and "all persons similarly 
situated in Salt Lake County government." [Id.] The Final Order found that a number of 
the named plaintiffs were entitled to back pay from the County. [Id.]4 Prior to issuing 
his Final Order, the arbitrator found in the Findings, Decision and Award (R. 2780-2788) 
referenced in his Final Order that the plaintiffs in the Diamant Lawsuit had 
demonstrated a gross unfairness with respect to his/her pay 
which constitutes a pay inequity. The applicability of 
comparing the base salary-factoring PLEC and date of actual 
deputy seniority is compelling. With this finding, it is 
determined that certain [plaintiffs] are entitled to receive back 
pay. (R.2786). 
The arbitrator also found that in each case were a back pay award was rendered, 
the party had been the victim of a pay inequity and was entitled to be compensated by the 
County. (Id). 
B. AFTER BEING TOLD THAT THE SWORN OFFICERS WILL BE 
TAKEN CARE OF, THE COUNTY GOES BACK ON ITS WORD. 
Even though the arbitrator's rulings were for the benefit of "all persons similarly 
situated in Salt Lake County Government," (R. 2776-2778), the County refused to apply 
those rulings to the Sworn Officers because they were not specifically named as plaintiffs 
in the Diamant Lawsuit. Instead of applying the arbitrator's rulings, the County 
instructed the Sworn Officers to file a grievance with the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Service 
4
 Those who were not awarded back pay failed to show the arbitrator that they had been 
paid inequitably. 
Commission. A letter to that effect was sent to the Sworn Officers on January 6, 1995. 
(R. 2886-2925). 
Prior to their receipt of that January 6, 1995 letter, the Sworn Officers were 
consistently told by the County that they would, in fact, be treated the same as the named 
plaintiffs in the Diamant Lawsuit, and that they would receive back pay if they could 
show entitlement to it under the rulings of the arbitrator. Indeed, Sheriff Aaron Kennard 
expressly informed the Sworn Officers "that the interests of all sworn members were 
represented in the Diamant action; that the County would pay all employees their 
respective back pay in the event the arbitrator found the existence of pay inequity; and 
that employees should not file separate actions or grievances because it would delay and 
complicate the resolution of the issues presented in the Diamant action." (R. 2792). 
Furthermore, the elected representatives of the County testified in depositions in 
this Lawsuit that, prior to January 6, 1995, the County had agreed to pay all sworn 
employees their respective back pay, including the Sworn Officers, if the arbitrator found 
the existence of pay inequity. Specifically, Commissioner Jim Bradley testified in his 
deposition that "we would presume that everybody else that fell into a similar situation 
should be treated the same" as the named plaintiffs in the Diamant Lawsuit, and that 
"what was good for [the Diamant plaintiffs] would be good for others." (R. 2479). 
On August 29, 1995, and because the County reneged on its agreement to apply 
the arbitrator's rulings across the board to all similarly situated individuals, nineteen of 
the Sworn Officers filed a notice of claim with the County regarding the pay equity issues 
involved in this Lawsuit. (R. 190-193).5 The notice of claim was filed on behalf of the 
5
 The Sworn Officers contend that the filing of a notice of claim was not a 
prerequisite for them to file suit, because they seek the equitable remedy of back pay and 
a class notice of claim already had been filed with the County in the Diamant Lawsuit. 
Nonetheless, the notice of claim was filed in an abundance of caution. 
Sworn Officers expressly identified and on behalf of "others whose identities are not 
known at this time (collectively 'Claimants')." [Id.] 
C- THE SWORN OFFICERS FILE SUIT IN ORDER TO ENFORCE 
AND PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS, 
On January 23, 1996, and because the County had done nothing to remedy the pay 
inequities suffered by the Sworn Officers, certain of the Sworn Officers, on behalf of 
themselves and "all other employees of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office who are 
similarly situated," filed this Lawsuit in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. 
(R. 1-31). This Lawsuit was initially assigned to the Honorable William B. Bohling. The 
County, Sheriff Aaron Kennard, the Sheriffs Office, and the Salt Lake County Deputy 
Sheriffs Merit Service Commission were all named as defendants. (R. 2). In their 
complaint, the Sworn Officers referenced the Diamant Lawsuit, and indicated that while 
they had been promised that they would be treated the same as the named plaintiffs in the 
Diamant Lawsuit, the defendants had reneged on their agreement and rejected their back 
pay claims. (R. 4-6). The Sworn Officers then asserted that, "just as those in the 
Diamant case," they had "not received equal pay." (R. 7). Finally, the Sworn Officers 
asserted that they, "just as those in the Diamant case, are entitled to certain back pay 
based upon the services they perform on behalf of defendants. However, defendants have 
refused to pay these [Sworn Officers] equal pay as other similarly situated employees of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office." (R. 7). The Sworn Officers then demanded on 
each of their causes of action "judgment in an amount of appropriate back pay, benefits, 
court costs and attorneys' fees in an amount to be proven at trial but not less than 
$200,000.00." (R. 8-9).6 
6
 Among other documents, the Sworn Officers attached as an exhibit to their 
complaint a copy of the complaint in the Diamant Lawsuit (R. 12-22). 
On February 20, 1996, the Sworn Officers filed a second amended complaint. (R. 
56-66). The second amended complaint added additional named plaintiffs to the caption 
and, in addition to the claims asserted in the original complaint, added a claim for breach 
of contract. (R. 56-57 & 64). The second amended complaint contained the same prayer 
for relief. (R. 65). On March 1, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
second amended complaint, along with a supporting memorandum. (R. 123-174). 
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that (a) the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the case (R. 129-131), (b) the Sworn Officers were required to comply 
with the Governmental Immunity Act (R. 131), (c) the Sworn Officers' claims were time-
barred under the Governmental Immunity Act (R. 131-132), (d) the defendants were 
immune under the discretionary functions doctrine (R. 132-133), (e) the Sworn Officers' 
breach of contract claim was barred because their terms of employment were governed 
"by statutes or policy and no public employee in Utah has a vested contractual right to 
continued employment contrary to the terms fixed by law" (R. 133-134), and (f) the 
Sworn Officers' negligent misrepresentation claim was barred by certain written policies 
of the County. (R. 135-136). The Sworn Officers filed a memorandum in opposition to 
the motion to dismiss, with attachments, disputing each of the arguments made in the 
motion to dismiss. (R. 175-196). The defendants then filed a reply. (R. 197-203). In 
their reply, the defendants explained that their statute of limitations argument was 
premised on the argument that the Diamant Lawsuit involved the same causes of action, 
and that the Sworn Officers had failed to bring suit within one year of the filing of the 
Diamant Lawsuit: 
7
 On August 14, 1996, the Sworn Officers filed a third amended complaint. (R. 
254-287). The third amended complaint added additional named plaintiffs, bringing the 
total to 124. (R. 254-257). The factual allegations, claims and prayer for relief remained 
the same as in the second amended complaint. (R. 258-264). 
A claim is barred unless the notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within one (1) 
year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. The plaintiffs' complaint admits that they 
were aware that a cause of action similar to this case, was 
filed by other deputies in March, 1994. They offer no 
explanation for their delay of more than three (3) years in 
bring this action other than they were mislead by Sheriff 
Kennard or that there is a continuing violation. 
(R. 198-199) (second emphasis added). 
The motion to dismiss was argued to Judge Bohling on June 3, 1996, and denied. 
(R. 209-214).8 After Judge Bohling denied the motion, the defendants filed yet another 
motion to dismiss. (R. 288-290). This second motion was premised solely on Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and asserted that the trial court could only consider the 
claims of the nineteen Sworn Officers who were specifically named in the notice of 
claim, and that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims of all remaining Sworn Officers. (R. 
292-293). While acknowledging that the notice of claim was also filed on behalf of 
"others whose identities are not known at this time," the defendants contended without 
legal support that "[t]o allow a class designation (and others whose identities are not 
known) would allow the unnamed persons to bypass the strict requirements of the 
immunity act." (R. 293). The Sworn Officers filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
defendants' second motion (R. 314-349), and the defendants filed a reply. (R. 350-358). 
8
 In briefing the motion to dismiss, both the defendants and the Sworn Officers 
submitted exhibits and other documents to the trial court that were outside the scope of 
the pleadings. (R. 139-174 (defendants' submissions); R. 190-196 (Sworn Officers' 
submissions)). Judge Bohling's order denying the motion to dismiss, therefore, was in 
essence an order denying a motion for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (if 
on a motion to dismiss "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56 . . ."). 
For some unexplained reason, however, the defendants withdrew their second motion 
before it could be heard. (R. 364). 
On July 16, 1999, almost three and one-half years after this Lawsuit was filed, the 
defendants finally answered the Sworn Officers' complaint. (R. 403-412). After the 
answer was filed, the parties engaged in extensive discovery. The Sworn Officers 
deposed Susan Biesele (R. 2265-2469), who at the time was employed by the Sheriffs 
Office in the personnel department. (R. 2265-2266). The Sworn Officers also deposed 
Commissioners Jim Bradley (R. 2472-2599) and Brent Overson (R. 2602-2659), and 
Sheriff Aaron Kennard. (R. 2664-2738).9 The defendants, on the other hand, 
propounded written discovery requests on each of the Sworn Officers. The Sworn 
Officer answered the written discovery, and the record of those responses is voluminous. 
(R. 695-2259). Among other evidence provided to the defendants in that written 
discovery, the Sworn Officers testified as follows concerning statements made by Sheriff 
Aaron Kennard and others concerning their ability to participate in the Diamant Lawsuit, 
and whether they should bring an independent lawsuit to obtain relief: 
Plaintiff is a member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Association ("Association"). The Association, through its 
elected officers, was informed by Sheriff Kennard and other 
representatives of the Sheriffs Office that the interests of all 
sworn employees were represented in the Diamant action; 
that the County would pay all the employees their respective 
back pay in the event the arbitrator found the existence of a 
pay inequity; and that employees should not file separate 
actions or grievances because it would delay and complicate 
the resolution of the issues presented in the Diamant action. 
Plaintiff also refers Defendants to the sworn deposition 
testimony of former Commissioner James Bradley. 
Commissioner Bradley testified that the County agreed to pay 
all sworn employees their respective back pay if the arbitrator 
9
 The Sworn Officers also obtained many documents from the defendants, through 
both formal and informal discovery means. (R. 3251-3344). 
found the existence of a pay inequity. 
(R. 2792-2793). As referenced in the discovery responses, Commissioner Jim Bradley 
also testified as followed when asked about whether the Sworn Officers should have been 
included as part of the Diamant Lawsuit: 
[W]e would presume that everybody that fell into a similar 
situation should be treated the same as they. We weren't 
breaking them out, saying, okay, because they're suing and 
they're going to get some resolve, hopefully that only they are 
subject to that that—you know, what was good for them 
would be good for others, I would presume. I think that was 
our—not remembering right now without reviewing it, the 
details of that case [the Diamant Lawsuit] or anything else, 
but it was my recollection is that however that was to be 
resolved, it should be integrated into the total system that all 
people in that class should have the same outcome benefitted 
to them. (R. 2479) (Emphasis supplied). 
D. THE SWORN OFFICERS ARE GRANTED PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, THE ARBITRATOR'S FORMULA IS APPLIED, AND 
A TRIAL IS HELD TO DETERMINE THE REMAINING CLAIMS. 
After the close of discovery, the parties each moved for summary judgment. (R. 
432-437; R. 2746-2748). The Defendants' motion requested the entry of judgment 
against the Sworn Officers "on all causes of action" asserted by the Sworn Officers, and 
was premised on the following arguments: (a) that "no contract of employment" existed 
to support the Sworn Officers' breach of contract claim; (b) that the Utah statutes relied 
upon by the Sworn Officers did not provide a private right of action; (c) that all Sworn 
Officers not specifically named in the notice of claim were "jurisdictionally barred" from 
10
 In the same discovery responses, the Sworn Officers testified that "Sheriff 
Kennard also acknowledged the arbitrator's decision to the [Swom Officers] in public 
speeches and mandatory training meetings (also known as question and answer sessions) 
and promised to apply the decision equally to all swom employees of the Sheriffs 
Office." (R. 2794). 
bringing suit; (d) that immunity had not been waived for the Sworn Officers' negligent 
misrepresentation claim; (e) that the Sheriffs Office and the Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Service Commission were not proper defendants; and (f) that Sheriff Kennard could only 
be sued in his representative capacity. (R. 434-435). Conversely, the Sworn Officers' 
motion requested partial summary judgment only (R. 2746-2748), and asked the trial 
court to find that the rulings made by the arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit were binding 
and controlling in this Lawsuit under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
(R. 2758-2760). The Sworn Officers also argued that, even if res judicata and collateral 
estoppel did not apply, they were entitled to prevail on the merits. (R. 2763-2769). 
The trial court held a hearing on the motions on November 2, 2000, and took them 
under advisement. (R. 3003-3006). On December 4, 2000, the trial court entered a 
written order concerning the motions. (R. 3008-3010). In its written order, the trial court 
concluded that the Sworn Officers were entitled to summary judgment on res judicata and 
collateral estoppel grounds: "I conclude that the issues decided in arbitration were 
sufficiently similar to the issues in the present case to meet the requirement of privity. 
Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to back pay under the arbitrator's order." (R. 3009). 
The trial court also concluded that the Sworn Officers' breach of contract and statutory 
entitlement claims were valid, that the claims were not barred by the discretionary 
functions doctrine, and that those Sworn Officers not specifically named in the notice of 
claim "have standing to proceed." (R. 3008-3009). The trial court also concluded that 
Sheriff Aaron Kennard could be sued only in an official capacity. (R. 3009). Finally, the 
trial court concluded that in order to recover a back pay award from the court, "each 
officer must individually demonstrate their entitlement to back pay based upon the 
arbitrator's formula." (Id.). 
After the entry of the December 4, 2000 order, the defendants filed a request for 
clarification concerning certain issues they believed were not addressed in the order, 
including the appropriate limitations period to apply in determining back pay. (R. 3023-
3042). On June 21, 2001, the trial court entered a scheduling order wherein it made the 
following clarifying rulings: (a) it dismissed the Sworn Officers' negligent 
misrepresentation claim with prejudice; (b) it dismissed the Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission as a party defendant; and (c) it held that the "124 plaintiffs currently named 
in the caption of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint are the only plaintiffs who are 
properly in this case, and entitled to present their damage calculations to the Court." (R. 
3066). Four days later, on June 25, 2001, the trial court held that the appropriate statute 
of limitations to be applied to the Sworn Officers' back pay claims was May 1, 1990 
through August 31, 1994, which was the same period adopted by the arbitrator in the 
Diamant Lawsuit. (R. 3081). 
After the trial court entered the foregoing orders, the Sworn Officers and the 
County (as it was the only remaining defendant in the case) engaged in efforts to apply 
the rulings and decisions of the arbitrator to the back pay claims asserted by the Sworn 
Officers. Those efforts were generally successful. By the end of November, 2001, the 
County and the Sworn Officers had reached an agreement as to the amount of back pay 
(if any) that 110 of the 124 Sworn Officers were entitled to receive under the arbitrator's 
formula. (R. 3925-3926). Of the 110 claims agreed upon, the parties agreed that 78 of 
the Sworn Officers were entitled to back pay, and that 32 of the Sworn Officers were not. 
(R. 3390). Thereafter, on December 4, 2001, the trial court held a one-day bench trial to 
determine the amount of back pay that should be awarded to the 14 remaining Sworn 
Officers whose claims could not be stipulated to. (R. 3958-3959). After taking the 
matter under advisement, the trial court ruled that the claims of 12 of the 14 Sworn 
Officers should be resolved as suggested by the Sworn Officers, and that the claims of 2 
of the Sworn Officers should be resolved as suggested by the County. (R. 4007-4010). 
On January 25, 2002, the trial court entered a final judgment consistent with the 
prior orders and decisions it had made in the case. (R. 4015-4024). That final judgment 
awarded specified amounts of back pay to 92 of the 124 Sworn Officers, and rejected the 
back pay claims of 32 of the 124 Sworn Officers. (Id.). It also awarded interest on the 
awards from September 1, 1994 until paid in full, at the rate of 7.34% per annum, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4. (R. 4016). Finally, it ordered the County to make 
any additional overtime and retirement contributions that were required because of the 
back pay awards. (R. 4020-4021). On February 21, 2002, the County filed its Notice of 
Appeal. (R. 4058-4090). Thereafter, on March 13, 2002, the trial court entered a 
supplemental order awarding overtime and retirement contributions to the 92 Sworn 
Officers who recovered back pay, which overtime and retirement contributions were 
stipulated to by the parties. (R. 4120-4126). Even though the overtime and retirement 
contributions were stipulated to, the County appealed that order as well. (R. 4128-4130). 
Pursuant to the trial court's final judgment and the other rulings and decisions in 
this case, the Sworn Officers who prevailed below are entitled to back pay from the 
County in the aggregate amount of $705,190.00, plus hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
interest, overtime and retirement contributions, on account of funds that they should have 
received between May 1, 1990 and August 31, 1994. (R. 4015-4024). The Sworn 
Officers, however, have yet to see a nickel of that money. Rather, on May 1, 2002, the 
trial court entered a stay of execution, and the Sworn Officers will not receive their back 
pay awards unless and until their judgment is affirmed. (R. 4171). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While the County raises no less than nine separate legal arguments in favor of 
reversal of the trial court, the County does not contest the amount of back pay, overtime 
and retirement that the 92 prevailing Sworn Officers are to receive in this matter if the 
trial court's judgment is affirmed. Therefore, with the single exception of entitlement to 
interest, the County appears to stipulate that if its arguments concerning liability are 
rejected, the specific amounts of back pay, overtime and retirement must be paid. 
Therefore, this appeal is about whether the Sworn Officers are entitled to prevail on their 
claims at all, not about what the Sworn Officers are to receive if they prevail. 
As shown below, the Sworn Officers are entitled to prevail, and the trial court's 
rulings should be affirmed. Moreover, each of the County's arguments should be 
rejected, both on the merits and because they are barred by principles of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. Indeed, the trial court did nothing more and nothing less than require, 
under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, that the rulings of the arbitrator in 
the Diamant Lawsuit, both those that were favorable and those that were unfavorable to 
the Sworn Officers, be applied here. The trial court required this because the County had 
already litigated the same back pay issues in the Diamant Lawsuit, and the trial court 
correctly determined that the parties should not be allowed litigate the issues again. 
Moreover, in applying principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the trial court 
also correctly found that the defenses raised in this Lawsuit were barred, because they 
either were or could have been raised in the Diamant Lawsuit. Finally, the trial court also 
correctly rejected the County's defenses on the merits. The Sworn Officers were not 
required to file a notice of claim before bring suit, because their claims are equitable 
claims not subject to the Governmental Immunity Act. Even if the Sworn Officers were 
required to file a notice of claim, however, that requirement was fulfilled, both in this 
Lawsuit and in the Diamant Lawsuit, and in any event the County is estopped from 
raising the argument as a defense. Moreover, the County's governmental functions 
argument is a red-herring, because the Sworn Officers do not complain about the 
adoption of the County's pay plan. Rather, they complain about being paid unfairly and 
inequitably under that plan. Similarly, the County's statute of limitations argument is 
unintelligible and nonsensical. The trial court applied the statute of limitations adopted 
by the arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit, which actually benefitted the County in this 
case. Finally, the trial court's decision to award prejudgment interest was sound. The 
Sworn Officers' back pay awards were calculated to a mathematical certainty, and in fact 
were stipulated to. Applying the arbitrator's formula, both the parties and the trial court 
were able to determine, to the penny, what each particular Sworn Officer was to recover 
in back pay and other benefits. The trial court's judgment, therefore, should be affirmed 
in all of its particulars. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PRINCIPLES 
OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRED 
ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE SWORN 
OFFICERS, AND REJECTION OF THE COUNTY'S DEFENSES. 
1. The Law Concerning Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel. 
The res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments raised by the County, if rejected 
by this Court, will be dispositive of this appeal. It will require affirmance of the trial 
court. And yet, strangely, the County spends only five pages on this critical issue in its 
brief, and raises only four feeble arguments. Each of those arguments lack merit, and the 
trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Res judicata bars relitigation of the same cause of action by the same parties or 
their privies. See Schaer v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983). If 
res judicata applies, it "precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been 
litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action . . . ." IdL On the 
other hand, "[cjollateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, prevents the 
relitigation of issues raised, litigated and resolved in a previous action." Macris & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). If 
issues were actually litigated, they are "precluded even if the claims for relief in the two 
actions are different, and even if only 'the party against whom the doctrine is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.5" Id. (quoting Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)). Both doctrines serve "the important policy of preventing previously litigated 
issues from being relitigated." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 
731, 733 (Utah 1995). 
Significantly, both of these doctrines apply to decisions made by arbitrators, just 
as they apply to decisions made by judges. See, e.g., Florabelle Coffey v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 961 F.2d 922, 925 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine of collateral 
estoppel also bars relitigation of legal or factual issues that have previously been decided 
through arbitration."); Pujol v. Shearson/American Exp., 829 F.2d 1201, 1208 (1st Cir. 
1987) (if a party had the "full power" to press its claim in an arbitration proceeding, "the 
arbitration decision . . . stands as a res judicata bar" to subsequent litigation of the 
claims). In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals in Macris applied collateral estoppel to 
preclude the relitigation of a fraudulent inducement claim which previously had been the 
subject of an arbitration. See Macris, 941 P.2d at 641 ("[W]e reject Image's argument 
that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the fraudulent inducement issue 
in the prior [arbitration] proceeding. We therefore affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on the fraudulent inducement claim based on collateral estoppel."). 
Finally, in determining whether res judicata or collateral estoppel apply in a case, 
the Court looks at the substance of the claims and defenses that have been asserted, not 
the pleading labels that the parties have chosen. See, e.g., McDonald v. Joint Rural High 
School Dist. No. 9, 306 P.2d 175, 179 (Kan. 1957) (in deciding whether claims or issues 
are the same, courts "look through form to substance in determining what a pleading is 
irrespective of its title"); People v. Tynan, 701 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) 
(whether res judicata or collateral estoppel should be applied "is a factual determination 
of substance, not mere form"). Indeed, as this Court recognized in Macris & Associates, 
Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 2000 UT 93, |28, 16 P.3d 1214, 1221, the issue is simply whether 
'"the two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a different 
kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of action.'" (Quoting Schaer v. 
State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983)). If not, then the doctrines apply. As shown 
below, the trial court's res judicata and collateral estoppel rulings were correct under 
these controlling legal standards. Indeed, if the doctrines do not apply on the facts of this 
case, then it is hard to imagine when they ever would apply. Therefore, the trial court's 
judgment in favor of the Sworn Officers should be affirmed. 
2. The County Already Litigated and Lost this Case, 
On April 30, 1991, Officers Diamant and Collins filed their notice of claim with 
the County. (R. 4176, second "Tab B"). The notice was filed "on behalf of all persons 
similarly situated in Salt Lake County government," and alleged that the County had had 
violated "U.C.A. 17-33-1, et seq." by virtue of its inequitable payment practices. (Id.). 
Thereafter, on March 24, 1992, Officers Diamant and Collins filed the Diamant Lawsuit. 
(R. 2970-2981). The Diamant Lawsuit also was filed on behalf of "all persons similarly 
situated in Salt Lake County government." (Id.). As in this case, the Diamant Lawsuit 
concerned the specific issue of unequal pay in the Sheriffs Office, and demanded back 
pay as a remedy. (Id.). Additionally, the Diamant complaint explicitly referenced Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-33-5 in the first cause of action. (R. 2972). 
In the Diamant Lawsuit, the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-5 to the pay 
equity claims asserted therein was raised by the County in a motion to dismiss. In 
essence, the County argued that the plaintiffs could not state a cause of action under that 
statute. (R. 4176, Tab "D"). The County's motion was denied. (R. 4176, Tab "E"). 
Thereafter, the County filed an answer wherein it asserted, among other defenses, many if 
not all of the same defenses that were asserted in this Lawsuit. (R. 4176, Tab "F"). In 
March of 1994, the parties in the Diamant Lawsuit stipulated to a dismissal of the 
lawsuit, and submitted the dispute to binding arbitration. (R. 3358-3359). The parties 
agreed that "any decision by the Arbitrator [would] be final and binding" on the parties. 
(R. 3359). Whether the Diamant Lawsuit should proceed as a class action was never 
decided by the trial court. 
In February of 1996, the parties in the Diamant Lawsuit filed motions for 
summary judgment with the arbitrator. (R. 4176, Tabs "K" and "L"). In its motion, the 
County argued that its policies concerning pay equity were "general policy statements" 
that did not give rise to a claim for back pay, that its policy of giving credit for outside 
law enforcement work did not violate the County's policies, and that the plaintiffs could 
not demonstrate a gross unfairness with respect to their pay so as to constitute a pay 
inequity. (Id.). On August 15, 1996, the arbitrator rejected each of the County's 
arguments, and ruled that the following formula would be used in deciding any pay 
equity claim that was placed before him: 
A comparison shall be made between the grievant's monthly 
salary and the comparable's monthly salary at the following 
points in time: May 1, 1990, December 1991, December 
1992, December 1993, August 1994. The difference between 
the comparable's monthly salary and the grievant's monthly 
salary at each of the foregoing points in time shall then be 
utilized to calculate the grievant's inequity for each of the 
respective years. (R. 4176, Tab "M"). 
Thereafter, on November 27, 1996, the arbitrator issued his Final Award. (R. 
2776-2778). The caption of the Final Order provided that it was for the benefit of "all 
persons similarly situated in Salt Lake County government." [Id.] The Final Order found 
that a number of the plaintiffs in the Diamant Lawsuit were entitled to back pay awards. 
[Id.] Prior to issuing his Final Order, the arbitrator found in the Findings, Decision and 
Award (R. 2780-2788) referenced in his Final Order that a number of the plaintiffs in the 
Diamant Lawsuit had 
demonstrated a gross unfairness with respect to his/her pay 
which constitutes a pay inequity. The applicability of 
comparing the base salary-factoring PLEC and date of actual 
deputy seniority is compelling. With this finding, it is 
determined that certain [Plaintiffs] are entitled to receive back 
pay. (R.2786). 
As the foregoing shows, in sum and substance (and also in form), the exact same 
claims and defenses at issue in this Lawsuit were at issue in the Diamant Lawsuit. That 
lawsuit, just like this Lawsuit, involved the specific question of whether sworn officers 
employed by the Sheriffs Officer were the victims of a pay inequity between May 1, 
1990 and August 31, 1994, and whether those sworn officers were entitled to back pay as 
a remedy. The arbitrator, of course, rejected the County's arguments and defenses, found 
that there were actionable pay inequities, and determined that a formula would be used to 
determine the amount of those inequities and therefore the amount of back pay to be 
awarded. That is the exact same process that the trial court ordered to be followed in this 
case, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. See Sew v. Sec. Title Co., 902 P.2d 
629, 633 (Utah 1995) ("issue preclusion prevents relitigation of the same issue even if the 
claims for relief in the two actions are different."); Macris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93, at 
|40, 16 P.3d at 1223 ("The general rule precluding relitigation of material facts or 
questions which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is applicable to all 
matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. This application of 
the general rule extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue . . . although no 
specific findings may have been made in reference to that matter, and although such 
matters were not directly referred to in the pleadings.'") (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Judgments, § 545). 
Nonetheless, the County argues that res judicata and collateral estoppel cannot be 
applied in this Lawsuit, because (a) the arbitration was "a voluntary settlement of 
grievances after dismissal of the Diamant lawsuit with prejudice," (b) the arbitrator's 
back pay awards were not returned to the trial court for confirmation under the Utah 
Arbitration Act, (c) the Sworn Officers are not in privity with the named plaintiffs in the 
Diamant Lawsuit, and (d) application of collateral estoppel against a governmental entity 
requires "full mutuality of parties." [County's Brief, at 27-30] Each of these arguments 
is without merit. 
First, the County's "voluntary settlement" assertion misstates the record. The 
parties stipulated to dismissal of the Diamant Lawsuit on the condition that the issues 
would be decided in binding arbitration. (R. 3359). Therefore, by agreeing to have their 
dispute decided by binding arbitration, the parties in the Diamant Lawsuit also agreed to 
be bound by the rulings made in that arbitration. See Macris, 2000 UT 93, at | 43, 16 
P.3d at 1223 ("An issue determined by stipulation rather than judicial resolution is 
binding in a subsequent action if the parties manifested an intention to that effect."). 
Moreover, in addition to misstating the record, this argument was not raised below, and 
therefore should not be considered on appeal. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 
38, T[30, 48 P.3d 895, 904 ("However, we decline to address this issue on appeal as it was 
never properly raised below."). 
Second, the County's argument that an arbitration award needs to be confirmed in 
order to be given preclusive effect also was not raised below, and should not be 
considered. Id Moreover, it is not an argument that the County supports with any 
applicable case law. Instead, the County states that there must be a "final judgment on 
the merits" for res judicata or collateral estoppel to apply, and then assumes without legal 
support that orders entered by an arbitrator in a binding arbitration do not qualify under 
this test unless they are confirmed. The Sworn Officers have already shown that 
decisions of an arbitrator are given the same weight as decisions by a court under these 
doctrines. See, e.g., Florabelle Coffey, 961 F.2d at 925 n.4; Pujol 829 F.2d at 1208; 
Maoris, 941 P.2d at 641. Moreover, a decision "on the merits" is not one that is rendered 
only after a trial. Rather, a decision on the merits is one that is rendered after the decision 
maker "evaluate[s] the relevant evidence and the parties' substantive arguments." Miller 
v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, f42 n. 6, 44 P.3d 663, 675. It cannot be disputed that 
the arbitrator made his decisions after considering the relevant evidence and the County's 
arguments. Therefore, the County's argument on this issue is without merit. 
Third, the County's lack of privity argument is just plain wrong. Privity is "a 
relationship between parties out of which there arises some mutuality of interest." 
11
 The County cannot in good faith dispute that the Diamant Lawsuit was sufficiently 
litigated to invoke the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. These principles 
apply to rulings granting pre-trial motions, such as motions to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, as well as to rulings made by a finder of fact after a full blown trial. See, e.g., 
Maoris & Assocs., 941 P.2d at 641. The Diamant Lawsuit was actively litigated by both 
sides, and the arbitrator considered the evidence and legal arguments of the parties before 
he made his rulings. 
Black's Law Dictionary, at 366 (2d ed. 1984). "In the context of res judicata, a person 
'in privity' is one so identified in interest with another that the same legal rights are 
represented." State v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The Sworn 
Officers were certainly nominal parties in the Diamant Lawsuit. The Diamant Lawsuit 
was filed on their behalf, and they were similarly situated to the named plaintiffs. Indeed, 
the complaint in the Diamant Lawsuit was filed under a federal statute that expressly 
authorized class actions. Moreover, the rulings of the arbitrator expressly stated that they 
were made on behalf of others similarly situated, which certainly included the Swom 
Officers. The named plaintiffs in the Diamant Lawsuit represented the common legal 
rights of all sworn employees of the Sheriffs Office, including the Swom Officers, and 
obtained rulings concerning those legal rights that were favorable. Thus, this dispute 
involves the same privies that litigated the Diamant Lawsuit, and the County's argument 
to the contrary is not well-taken. Indeed, it was the County's decision to exclude the 
Sworn Officers from the Diamant Lawsuit, even though the County had previously 
promised the Swom Officers that they would be included. (R. 2792; R. 2479). 
Therefore, the County cannot complain that the Swom Officers did not present their 
claims in the Diamant Lawsuit. It was the County's fault that they didn't. 
Finally, the County's argument that collateral estoppel against a governmental 
entity requires "full mutuality of parties" likewise should be rejected. Again, it is not an 
argument that was raised below, and it should not be considered here. Holmes Dev., 
LLC, 2002 UT 38, at ^30, 48 P.3d at 904. Moreover, the County acknowledges that this 
is not currently the rule in Utah (although the County asks this Court to adopt such a 
rule), and the County offers no sound policy reason for adopting such a rule. Indeed, 
while such a rule might be sound in some factual situations, this is not one of them. In 
this case, the Diamant plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of all similarly situated 
employees of the Sheriffs Office, and the County lost the case. The County then refused 
to allow the Sworn Officers to participate, even though the legal and factual issues which 
supported their claims were the same. This Court, therefore, should save for another day 
the question of whether collateral estoppel requires full mutuality when it is applied 
against a governmental entity. 
In any event, however, because the Diamant Lawsuit was filed as a class action, 
and because class certification was never denied (either before or after the case went to 
arbitration), there is mutuality in this case. All that happened is that after the Diamant 
plaintiffs obtained rulings that applied to all, including the Sworn Officers, the County 
refused to recognize those rulings. In fact, what the County really is saying in this appeal 
is that it should not be bound by the rulings in the Diamant Lawsuit, because the 
arbitrator got it wrong. However, "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed 
judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been 
wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case." Federated 
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). The trial court should be 
affirmed, and its judgment against the County should stand. 
B. THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF THE IMMUNITY 
ACT DO NOT APPLY TO EQUITABLE CLAIMS FOR BACK PAY 
AND, EVEN IF THEY DO, THE ACT WAS COMPLIED WITH. 
As its initial argument, the County asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider any claim other than "breach of contract" concerning all but the nineteen Sworn 
Officers specifically named in the notice of claim.12 Of course, this issue becomes moot 
12
 The County concedes that the notice of claim requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act do not apply to claims based on breach of contract. [County's Brief, at 
20]. 
if this Court finds that the trial court correctly applied the res judicata and collateral 
estoppel doctrines in ruling that the parties were bound in all respects by the rulings and 
decisions of the arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit, and that the Sworn Officers should 
have been included in that proceeding in the first place. 
Moreover, even if this issue is not moot, the County's argument is wrong as a 
matter of law for at least three reasons. First, the County incorrectly focuses on the labels 
that were used in the pleadings, rather than on the substance of the claims that were 
asserted by the Sworn Officers. Utah's courts have long concerned themselves more with 
the substance of a particular action than the labels that the parties may attach to their 
claims. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, 1J16, 981 P.2d 841, 845 ("It is the 
substance of the action with which we are concerned rather than the label applied."); 
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 5 Utah 2d 230, 234, 300 P.2d 600, 602 
(1956) ("Regardless of the title of the petition, or even of the section of statute which 
appellants claim Prichard was proceeding under, the law is more concerned with 
substance than with labels or titles."). 
In sum and substance, the claims that were asserted both in the Diamant Lawsuit 
and by the Sworn Officers here were equitable claims for back pay. See, e.g., West v. 
Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217 (1999) ("We recognize that subsection 717(b) explicitly 
mentions certain equitable remedies, namely, reinstatement, hiring, and back pay, and it 
does not explicitly refer to compensatory damages."); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of 
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 662-63 (1978) ("We granted certiorari . . . to consider 
'[wjhether local government officials . . . are 'persons' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their 
official capacities.") (emphasis supplied); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 
625 F.2d 918, 949 (10th Cir. 1979) ("The entire back pay concept constitutes equitable 
relief designed to restore and make whole the victims of discrimination."); Thurston v. 
Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) (noting that reinstatement with back pay is 
an equitable remedy). The County even admits as much in its brief. In fact, the County's 
entire prejudgment interest argument is premised upon the notion that the Sworn 
Officers' claims are equitable in nature, and that it is inappropriate to award prejudgment 
interest on equitable claims. [See County's Brief, at 40-42] 
The Sworn Officers did not seek, and were not awarded, compensatory damages. 
Rather, they were awarded the equitable remedy of back pay. These are two entirely 
different things. See, e.g., Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (discussing remedies under the Civil Rights Act and noting that "the new 
compensatory damages provision of the [Act] is 'in addition to,' and does not replace or 
duplicate, the backpay remedy allowed under prior law."); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, 79 
F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that prior to certain amendments to Title VII, 
"plaintiff could not obtain compensatory damages, but was restricted to the traditional 
equitable remedies of reinstatement, back pay, and front pay, as well as declaratory and 
injunctive relief"); Harmon v. May Broad. Co., 583 F.2d 410, 411 (8th Cir. 1978) ("An 
award of back pay . . . is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement and is 
not comparable to damages in a common law action . . . ."). 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should have no trouble finding that the 
County's notice claim argument lacks merit. It has long been the law in Utah that the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to equitable claims like the back pay claims 
asserted by the Sworn Officers here. Indeed, as explained by the Court in El Rancho 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977), in a case involving 
alleged overcharges for water and sewer services, "[t]he common law exception to 
governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long been recognized in this 
jurisdiction." Id., at 779; see also American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 
P.2d 757, 759-60 (Utah 1992) (equitable claims are "exempt from the filing requirements 
and time limits imposed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act"). Because the Sworn 
Officers' claims are equitable claims, and because the Governmental Immunity Act does 
not apply to equitable claims, the County's notice of claim argument is without merit. 
The Sworn Officers simply were not required to file a notice of claim in order to proceed 
against the County.13 
Second, even if the Sworn Officers were required to file a notice of claim as a 
prerequisite to bringing suit (and they were not), they fully complied with that 
requirement. In fact, they complied on two separate occasions. "The primary purpose of 
the notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible public authorities an 
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public 
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 
482 (Utah 1980). On April 30, 1991, Officers Diamant and Collins filed their notice of 
claim with the County. (R. 4176, second "Tab B"). The notice of claim was filed "on 
behalf of all persons similarly situated in Salt Lake County government." Thereafter, on 
March 24, 1992, Officers Diamant and Collins filed the Diamant Lawsuit. (R. 2970-
2981). The Diamant Lawsuit was filed as a class action on behalf of "all persons 
similarly situated in Salt Lake County government." (Id.). In fact, Officers Diamant and 
Collins signed the complaint under oath, and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "An action to recover the liability 
prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer 
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any 
one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees 
similarly situated." (emphasis supplied). Finally, on August 29, 1995, nineteen of the 
13
 The trial court did not expressly adopt this argument in granting partial summary 
judgment, although the argument was clearly raised below. (R. 2767-2769). This Court 
may affirm a judgment on any ground, so long as the ground was raised below or is 
apparent on the record. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, TflO, 52 P.3d 1158. 
Sworn Officers in this Lawsuit filed a notice of claim with the County. That notice of 
claim also was filed on behalf of "others whose identities are not known at this time 
(collectively 'Claimants')." It was signed by Bryon J. Benevento, as attorney for all of 
the Claimants. Mr. Benevento also is the attorney of record for all of the Sworn Officers 
here. 
A notice of claim is sufficient if it is signed by the "agent" of the person making 
the claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. Clearly, Mr. Benevento is the agent of each of 
the 124 Sworn Officers named as plaintiffs in this Lawsuit. Therefore, the notice of 
claim filed by Mr. Benevento was sufficient with respect to all 124 Sworn Officers. Even 
if it was not, however, the notice of claim filed by Mr. Benevento was not necessary, as 
both the class notice of claim and the class complaint in the Diamant Lawsuit already had 
been served on the County, and they were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial 
court to consider the Sworn Officers' back pay claims. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the County asserts that Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. 
Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379, "is dispositive" of the notice of claim issue, 
and that it requires this Court to rule in the County's favor, because the Court in that case 
ruled that "each plaintiffs name must be on the notice of claim." [County's Brief, at 22]. 
In fact, however, that case is not applicable. Unlike in this Lawsuit, and also unlike in 
the Diamant Lawsuit, the notice of claim in Pigs Gun Club was not a class action notice 
of claim. Rather, it identified "only PGC and Mr. Roberts as claimants." Id,, f^ 10. The 
fatal flaw in the County's argument is that the County wants to apply the Pigs Gun Club 
case across the board, to both individual and class actions, even though it was not a class 
action case. If the County's argument were adopted, there could never be a class action 
tort or other claim brought against a governmental entity, because the notice of claim 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act could never be complied with. One 
could never "specifically name" all of the people who were in the class making the claim. 
Fortunately, this Court has already rejected, at least implicitly, the very argument 
that the County is putting forward. In Moreno v. Board of Education, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 
1996), a plurality of this Court held that Laura Bartlett had standing to pursue a wrongful 
death claim against the Jordan School District concerning the death of her son Bill, even 
though she had failed to file a notice of claim, because Bill's guardians had filed a timely 
notice of claim. This Court concluded that because the guardians had standing to sue on 
behalf of Bill's heirs, including Laura, the notice of claim filed by the guardians was 
sufficient. Id, at 892. As was explained last year by the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
Moreno case "turns on one key concept, namely, the standing of the party who files the 
notice of claim. Only parties with standing to bring an action can file an effective notice 
of claim." Great West Cas. Co. v. UDOT, 2001 UT App. 54, ^[15, 21 P.3d 240. 
It cannot be disputed that a class plaintiff has standing to assert a claim on behalf 
of all persons similarly situated. Indeed, our rules provide for just that result—class 
actions can be filed and maintained, and the named plaintiffs may proceed "as 
representative parties on behalf of all." Utah R. Civ. P. 23. Therefore, this Court should 
conclude that the class action notices of claim filed in the Diamant Lawsuit and in this 
Lawsuit, and the class action complaint filed in the Diamant Lawsuit, were in compliance 
with the Governmental Immunity Act, and that the County's arguments to the contrary 
lack merit. See Andrew S. Arena v. Superior Court, 788 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Az. 1990) 
("We hold that [the Arizona Governmental Immunity Act] does not bar class actions 
against public entities. Therefore, a claim against a public entity may be presented as a 
class claim.").14 
14
 It is clear that a class action can be maintained against the state and its political 
subdivisions. In fact, in Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, 458 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 38, this Court addressed the merits of a class action that was filed against the 
State of Utah concerning Medicaid repayment liens. The question of whether the case 
should proceed as a class action was not even questioned. 
Finally, this Court should find that even if the Sworn Officers were required to file 
a notice of claim and that they did not comply with this requirement, the County is 
estopped from asserting the notice of claim requirements of the Governmental Immunity 
Act as a defense. Utah law holds that when a governmental entity lulls a party into not 
complying with the Governmental Immunity Act, the government is estopped from 
asserting the Governmental Immunity Act as a defense. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). The Sworn Officers were consistently told by 
the County that they would, in fact, be treated the same as the named plaintiffs in the 
Diamant Lawsuit, and that they would receive back pay if they could show entitlement to 
it under the arbitrator's formula. Indeed, Sheriff Aaron Kennard and other members of 
the Sheriffs Office expressly informed the Sworn Officers "that the interests of all sworn 
members were represented in the Diamant action; that the County would pay all 
employees their respective back pay in the event the arbitrator found the existence of pay 
inequity; and that employees should not file separate actions or grievances because it 
would delay and complicate the resolution of the issues presented in the Diamant action." 
(R. 2792). Furthermore, Commissioner Jim Bradley testified in his deposition that "we 
would presume that everybody else that fell into a similar situation should be treated the 
same" as the named plaintiffs in the Diamant Lawsuit, and that "what was good for [the 
Diamant plaintiffs] would be good for others." (R. 2479). Of course, the County then 
went back on its word, and the Sworn Officers sued. On these facts, this Court should 
hold that the County is estopped from raising the Governmental Immunity Act as a 
defense in this Lawsuit. Cf Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 28, 456 P.2d 159, 
163 (1969) ("One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of 
security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead 
that very delay as a defense to the action when brought."). 
C. THE COUNTY'S CONTRACTUAL ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE 
REJECTED AS COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT AND WRONG. 
The County, citing Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App. 100, 46 P.3d 247, 
and Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), also argues 
that the trial court erred in determining that there was an employment contract between 
the County and the Sworn Officers, and in entering judgment on that contract. [County's 
Brief, at 31-33]. The fundamental flaw in this argument is that it incorrectly assumes that 
an employment contract was the basis for the trial court's summary judgment ruling. It 
was not. As set forth more fully above, the trial court entered partial summary judgment 
for the Sworn Officers because the arbitrator had ruled in favor of the Diamant plaintiffs 
and against the County in the Diamant Lawsuit. The Diamant plaintiffs raised the same 
claims for back pay to the arbitrator, and the County defended and lost those claims and 
then paid the named Diamant plaintiffs back pay awards. The trial court correctly 
determined that because the County had already litigated and lost this case, it was 
required to enter partial summary judgment for the Sworn Officers and against the 
County, regardless of how the Sworn Officers had denominated their claims in this case. 
The Court wrote: "I conclude that the issues decided in arbitration were sufficiently 
similar to the issues in the present case to meet the requirement of privity. Therefore, 
plaintiffs are entitled to back pay under the arbitrator's order." (R. 3009). 
It cannot be disputed that the Diamant Lawsuit concerned the same issue as 
presented here—whether the County paid its sworn law enforcement officers inequitably 
for the period of May 1, 1990 through August 31, 1994, and whether the County could be 
required to remedy that inequity through the payment of back pay. It also cannot be 
disputed that, at least with respect to the named Diamant plaintiffs, the arbitrator ruled 
against the County and ordered the County to correct the wrong it had done. 
Notwithstanding this history, the County comes to this Court and says that the Sworn 
Officers in this case have no remedy for the very same wrong, because the County did not 
allow them to participate in the Diamant Lawsuit, even after promising them that they 
could. According to the County, even though an arbitrator found that they violated the 
law and their own employment policies in their payment practices concerning sworn law 
enforcement officers (regardless of whether this finding was based upon a contractual 
theory, a statutory theory or general principles of equity), and even though the County in 
fact paid certain sworn law enforcement officers back pay to remedy that wrong, the 
Sworn Officers are out of luck. They cannot assert a breach of contract claim, they 
cannot assert a statutory claim, they cannot assert an equitable claim, and they cannot 
assert entitlement to the same treatment on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds. 
The County's argument is disingenuous. If the Sworn Officers' claims are 
rejected by this Court, then a patent inconsistency will have resulted. The plaintiffs in the 
Diamant Lawsuit will have received back pay awards to remedy inequitable payment 
practices that occurred in the Sheriffs Office from May 1, 1990 through September 1, 
1994. The Sworn Officers in this Lawsuit, however, will be left without a remedy even 
though they were the victims of the very same wrong and even though they also proved 
that they were entitled to a back pay award under the arbitrator's formula. This Court 
should reject the County's gamesmanship, and affirm the trial court. 
Finally, even if Knight and Horn are germane to this appeal (and they are not), 
they actually support the Sworn Officers' position rather than the County's position here. 
Both cases are statute of limitations cases, and hold that a three year statute of limitations 
should be applied when dealing with the claims of a governmental employee against his 
or her employer. This is a longer period than was adopted both by the arbitrator in the 
Diamant Lawsuit and by the trial court here. Moreover, as noted by the court in Horn, 
disputes concerning vested rights are "an exception to the general rule that civil servants' 
employment rights are statutory rather than contractual." 962 P.2d at 100. The Sworn 
Officers in this case brought suit to vindicate their vested property rights. They had 
already performed work for the County (from May 1, 1990 through August 31, 1994), 
and they were seeking to recover the wages, overtime and retirement that should have 
been paid to them for the work that they had performed during that period. Thus, unlike 
in Horn, the Sworn Officers in this Lawsuit did indeed have a valid breach of contract 
claim to assert against the County, which claim was premised on the County's failure to 
pay the Sworn Officers wages and other benefits that had already been earned. 
Therefore, even if the trial court awarded judgment to the Sworn Officers on a breach of 
contract theory, that decision was sound. 
D. THE COUNTY'S LAW OF THE CASE ARGUMENT DOES NOT 
MATTER AND ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
The County also asserts that Judge Henriod incorrectly applied the law of the case 
doctrine in refusing to consider Judge Bohling's previous interlocutory orders. This 
error, the County claims, denied the County "the ability to raise and pursue any defenses 
to either cause of action, including those based upon governmental immunity." 
[County's Brief, at 23] 
The law of the case doctrine prevents "one district court judge [from] overruling 
another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 
(Utah 1987); see also Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc., 692 P.2d 735 (Utah 
1984). It does not preclude a judge from changing his or her mind. Id. In this case, 
Judge Henriod adopted Judge Bohling's prior rulings, because he found them to be 
sound. (R. 3008). There was simply no reason to deviate from them at the time. 
Moreover, even if Judge Henriod's use of the law of the case doctrine to support his 
ruling was error, any such error is harmless and had no impact on the case given Judge 
Henriod's other rulings in this case. As this Court is aware, it may affirm a ruling based 
upon different grounds than those relied upon by the trial court, so long as the ground or 
theory was raised below or is apparent on the record. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 
UT 58,^10, 52 P.3d 1158. 
After adopting Judge Bohling's prior rulings, Judge Henriod granted partial 
summary judgment to the Sworn Officers on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds. 
(R. 3009). In essence, he ruled that the parties would be governed in all respects by the 
rulings and decisions of the arbitrator, and by the results of the Diamant Lawsuit. In the 
Diamant Lawsuit, the County raised each and every one of the issues that it raises here, 
with the possible exception of whether the Sworn Officers complied with the notice of 
claim requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. This included the exact same 
issues that Judge Henriod found barred by the law of the case doctrine. (R. 4176, Tabs 
"D," "E," "F" & "G"). This also included arguments concerning the statute of 
limitations, the governmental functions doctrine, and whether either the County 
Personnel Management Act or the Deputy Sheriff Merit System Act provided a private 
cause of action. (Id.) Notwithstanding each of these arguments, the arbitrator ruled in 
favor of the Diamant plaintiffs, and gave each plaintiff the opportunity to show a pay 
inequity under his formula. (R. 4176, Tab "M"; R. 2776-2778; R. 2780-2788). 
Therefore, even if Judge Henriod was wrong in his application of the law of the 
case doctrine, the error was harmless. Each of the arguments that Judge Henriod rejected 
on law of the case grounds also were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. '"To warrant reversal, two elements must be shown: error, and injury to the 
party appealing. Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or merely academic, and not 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and where it in no way 
affects the final outcome of the case; it is prejudicial, and ground for reversal, only when 
it affects the final result of the case and works adversely to a substantial right of the party 
assigning it.5" Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 552 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1976) 
(quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, § 776). Here, any error committed by Judge 
Henriod was "trivial, formal or merely academic," and did effect the final result. The 
trial court, therefore, should be affirmed. 
E. THE COUNTY'S GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS ARGUMENT IS 
A RED-HERRING, AND SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
The County also argues that the Sworn Officers' claims are barred by the 
governmental functions doctrine found at Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1). [County's Brief, 
at 36-37]. The County raised this issue in the Diamant Lawsuit. (R. 4176, Tabs "F," "I," 
"K" and "L"). The arbitrator, however, entered back pay awards for a number of the 
Diamant plaintiffs. (R. 2780-2788). This could not have occurred had the arbitrator 
adopted the County's governmental functions argument. Therefore, the County's 
governmental functions argument is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, 
because it is an argument that either was litigated or that could have been litigated in the 
Diamant Lawsuit. 
Moreover, even if it is not barred, the Sworn Officers are not challenging the 
adoption of the County's pay plan. Rather, they challenge the County's decision to 
misapply that pay plan after it was adopted. The County certainly has no discretion to 
unfairly discriminate against its employees. State law prohibits such conduct. Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii). So does the County's employment policies. As this Court 
held in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1985), a "decision or action 
implementing a preexisting policy is operational in nature and is undeserving of 
protection under the discretionary function exception." (Emphasis supplied). The 
County's decision to pay the Sworn Officers inequitably was not discretionary. It was an 
operational decision, and the County is simply not immune from suit. The trial court 
should be affirmed. 
F. THE COUNTY'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT IS 
UNINTELLIGIBLE AND JUST PLAIN WRONG. 
The County's penultimate argument is that the "trial court erred by not applying 
the correct statute of limitations to the Deputies' statutory cause of action and by failing 
to address when the Deputies' claim accrued, triggering the running of the statute of 
limitations." [County's Brief, at 28] The trial court applied a limitations period of May 
1, 1990 through August 31, 1994, which is the exact same limitations period as was 
applied in the Diamant Lawsuit. (R. 2782 & 3081). Therefore, if this Court accepts the 
trial court's res judicata and collateral estoppel decisions, this Court will necessarily have 
to reject this argument. 
This Court also should reject this argument because it is unintelligible and just 
plain wrong. The County assumes that the only cognizable claims asserted by the Sworn 
Officers are their statutory claims, asserts that the statute of limitations for such claims is 
three years, and further asserts that the claims are time-barred because the statute of 
limitations began to run when the Sworn Officers were all hired by the County, which 
occurred prior to January of 1992, and this Lawsuit was not filed until January of 1996. 
[County's Brief, at 39-40] It is undisputed, however, that if the Sworn Officers were paid 
inequitably by the County, that inequity occurred on a continuing basis until September 
1, 1994, when the County's new payment plan was adopted. That is what the arbitrator 
found. It is not when the Sworn Officers were hired, but when the County's unlawful 
continuing conduct ceased, that is important in deciding the statute of limitations question 
presented by the County. See, e.g.. Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 
1232 (Utah 1998) (where a wrong is continuing, "the person injured may bring 
successive actions for damages" until the wrong stops, "even though an action on the 
original wrong may be barred, but recovery is limited to actual injury suffered within the 
three years prior to the commencement of each action."). As the Sworn Officers' notice 
of claim was filed on August 29, 1995, less than one year after the adoption of the 
County's new pay plan, the Sworn Officers' claims are clearly timely. 
Moreover, the County's entire limitations argument is based upon two incorrect 
assumptions: (a) that the Sworn Officers' claims are statutory claims subject to a three 
year statute of limitations, and (b) that the statute of limitations was not tolled while the 
Diamant Lawsuit was pending. As set forth above, regardless of the label chosen, the 
Sworn Officers' claims are equitable claims for back pay. Under Utah law, equitable 
claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See American Tierra Corp. v. City 
of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 761 (Utah 1992) (holding that the "four-year catch-all" 
statute of limitations found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 applies "to equitable actions"). 
Indeed, as this Court noted in CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State of Utah, 2001 UT 37, f 10, 
24 P.3d 966, where a claim is "based upon 'justice and fairness' it sounds in equity" and 
"the four-year statute of limitations in section 78-12-25(1)" applies to the claim. 
Moreover, even if the Sworn Officers' claims are considered legal claims for breach of 
contract, they still are subject to a four-year statute of limitations pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25(1), which provides a four-year limitations period for any action founded 
"upon a contract, obligations, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing." 
Thus, the real question for this Court to decide (assuming it does not simply apply 
the limitations period applied by the arbitrator in the Diamant Lawsuit and the trial court 
below) is whether the four-year period should run from August 29, 1991 (four years prior 
to the filing of the Sworn Officers' notice of claim), or whether instead it should run from 
May 1, 1987 (four years prior to the filing of the notice of claim in the Diamant Lawsuit). 
If the Court chooses the former period, then the Sworn Officers are entitled to recover 
back pay for inequities occurring between August 29, 1991 and September 1, 1994. If 
the Court chooses the latter period, however, then the Sworn Officers are entitled to 
recover back pay for inequities occurring between May 1, 1987 and September 1, 1994. 
The Sworn Officers believe that the trial court's application of the arbitrator's 
limitations period in this case was correct, and that the decision should be affirmed. If it 
was not, however, then the longer period, from May 1, 1987 to September 1, 1994, is the 
correct period to apply in this Lawsuit. It is the correct period to apply because the 
statute of limitations was continuously tolled from the filing of the Diamant notice of 
claim through the filing of this Lawsuit. Under the Governmental Immunity Act, the 
time period between the filing of a notice of claim and the subsequent filing of a lawsuit 
is not counted in determining whether the applicable statute of limitations has run. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-15(2). Moreover, under the law of Utah and every other jurisdiction, 
when an action is filed as a class action, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all class 
members until a court makes final the denial of class certification. Indeed, it is hornbook 
law that "[t]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of 
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the 
suit been permitted to continue as a class action." American Tierra Corp., 840 P.2d at 
762. Tolling does not cease until a court makes "final the denial of class certification." 
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The notice of claim that was filed on May 1, 1991 in the Diamant Lawsuit was 
filed "on behalf of all persons similarly situated in Salt Lake County government." The 
Diamant complaint also was filed on behalf of "all persons similarly situated in Salt Lake 
County government," and cited a federal statute which expressly allowed class relief. 
The "similarly situated" language found in the Diamant notice of claim and subsequent 
complaint is the classic language employed when a lawsuit is filed as a class action. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if [certain requirements are established]."). 
Thus, it cannot be disputed that the Diamant Lawsuit was intended, at least by the 
persons who filed it, to proceed as a class action to resolve in one proceeding the pay 
inequity problems that were then occurring at the Sheriffs Office. 
Judge Young was never asked to decide the class certification issue while he had 
the Diamant Lawsuit. Nor was the arbitrator asked to decide the question while he had 
the case. In fact, the arbitrator's ruling finding pay inequity and establishing a damages 
formula expressly noted that it was for the benefit of "all persons similarly situated in 
Salt Lake County Government," which would necessarily include the Sworn Officers. 
(R. 2776-2778). Thus, because the Diamant Lawsuit was filed as a class action and class 
certification never was denied, the statute of limitations was continuously tolled from the 
date of filing of the Diamant notice of claim (May 1, 1991) through the date of the filing 
of this Lawsuit (January 23, 1996), as the Diamant arbitration was still pending at that 
time. Therefore, under the controlling law, and assuming that this Court refuses to apply 
the arbitrator's limitations period, the Sworn Officers are entitled to recover back pay for 
pay inequities that occurred from May 1, 1987 (four years prior to the filing of the 
Diamant notice of claim) to September 1, 1994.15 
G. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST TO THE PREVAILING SWORN OFFICERS, AS THEIR 
BACK PAY AWARDS WERE CALCULATED WITH CERTAINTY. 
In its last argument on appeal, the County asserts that even if the Sworn Officers 
are entitled to back pay and other benefits, it was error for the trial court to award them 
prejudgment interest. The County's argument is premised upon the notion that the trial 
court's decision to award back pay was "a determination of its best judgment in assessing 
what is 'equitable' compensation either under an employment contract or requirements of 
statute." [County's Brief, at 41] Therefore, according to the County, prejudgment 
interest may never be awarded when, as in this case, a party prevails on an equitable 
claim and is awarded back pay. 
As with many arguments made by the County in this appeal, this argument is one 
that was never presented to the trial court. Rather, the County argued to the trial court 
that prejudgment should not be awarded because (a) the arbitrator in the Diamant 
Lawsuit did not specifically award prejudgment interest, and (b) the Sworn Officers' 
back pay claims could not be calculated "to a mathematical certainty." (R. 3353). 
Because the County did not raise its "no interest on equitable claims" argument to the 
trial court, this Court should refuse to consider it here. See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38 at 
The County also is estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a 
defense in this action. As set forth herein, prior to January of 1995, the County told the 
Sworn Officers that "that the interests of all sworn members were represented in the 
Diamant action; that the County would pay all employees their respective back pay in the 
event the arbitrator found the existence of pay inequity; and that employees should not 
file separate actions or grievances because it would delay and complicate the resolution 
of the issues presented m the Diamant action." A defendant, be it the government or a 
private party, cannot lull a plaintiff into failing to protect his rights, and then assert the 
statute of limitations as a defense. Principles of estoppel preclude such conduct. See, 
e.g., Whitaker, 522 P.2d at 1252-53. 
1J30,48 P.3d at 904. 
Moreover, even if this Court determines that the County did preserve this 
argument for appeal, the fact of the matter is that if prejudgment is not proper in this case, 
then it is never proper. The County cites no law which precludes the award of 
prejudgment interest to a party who is awarded back pay. This is not surprising. It has 
long been the rule in Utah that interest is allowed "whenever justice and equity require 
allowance " Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1976). And it is routine for the federal courts to award prejudgment interest on back pay 
awards, to make the victims of discrimination whole. See, e.g., Brock v. Richardson, 812 
F.2d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 1987) ("We also conclude that a back pay award . . . should be 
presumed to carry both post-judgment interest and pre-judgment interest unless the 
equities in a particular case require otherwise."); Blakely v. Continental Airlines, 2 F. 
Supp. 2d 598, 609 (D.N.J. 1998) ("Because Blakely was found to be entitled to back pay 
and damages, she is entitled to prejudgment interest for the loss of the use of the amount 
included in her award."). In fact, this Court has expressly directed the payment of 
interest on a back pay award, which is all that the trial court directed here. See Piacitelli 
v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah 1981) (directing payment of 
interest, "at the statutory rate," on plaintiffs back pay award). Therefore, the County's 
position is untenable. 
Second, it is clear that on the facts of this case, an award of prejudgment interest to 
the Sworn Officers was more than appropriate. This Court first discussed the rationale 
behind prejudgment interest in Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 
1003, 1005-06 (1907). In Fell, the Court noted that because damages are intended to 
return a plaintiff to the status quo, prejudgment interest is available where necessary to 
accomplish full compensation. Id. Therefore, "where the damage is complete and the 
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts 
and figures, interest should be allowed from that time and not from the date of the 
judgment." Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 
930 (1977); see also Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983) 
("Prejudgment interest may be awarded in a case where the loss is fixed as of a particular 
time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy."). 
Moreover, it does not matter that the award is at some point unliquidated. Fell, 88 P. at 
1007. If sufficient mathematical certainty exists, courts should allow interest from the 
time when the award became fixed, rather than from the date a judgment is entered by the 
court. Bjork, 560 P.2d at 317. 
Application of these principles to the facts of this case show that the trial court's 
award of prejudgment interest was entirely proper, and that there is no legal basis to 
overturn it. The losses that the Sworn Officers suffered as a result of the County's 
actions were fixed as of September 1, 1994. On that date, the County implemented a new 
pay plan that remedied the pay inequity problems that had existed prior to that date. 
Moreover, those losses can be, and in fact were, calculated to a mathematical certainty. 
Indeed, the parties stipulated to the amount of back pay that was to be awarded to 110 of 
the 124 Sworn Officers. Moreover, the issues surrounding the 14 remaining Sworn 
Officers whose claims were tried to the trial court had nothing to do with math. Rather, 
the dispute centered on how the math was to be done. Once those rulings were made, the 
parties easily and without dispute were able to figure out how much back pay was to be 
awarded to those remaining Sworn Officers. 
In short, this is the classic case where prejudgment interest should be awarded. 
The parties and the trial court were able to determine to a certainty the exact date that 
prejudgment interest should run from (September 1, 1994), and they also were able to 
determine to a certainty the amount of the back pay that was to be awarded to each Sworn 
Officer. Indeed, in calculating back pay, the parties and the trial court simply applied the 
arbitrator's mathematical formula to their particular factual situation. That mathematical 
formula is as follows: 
A comparison shall be made between the grievant's monthly 
salary and the comparable's monthly salary at the following 
points in time: May 1, 1990, December 1991, December 
1992, December 1993, August 1994. The difference between 
the comparable's monthly salary and the grievant's monthly 
salary at each of the foregoing points in time shall then be 
utilized to calculate the grievant's inequity for each of the 
respective years. [Order Regarding Executive Session of 
August 7, 1996] 
The trial court's award of prejudgment interest was proper, and it should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's entry of judgment against the County was proper, and it should be 
affirmed. The County litigated and lost the very same equal pay issues in the Diamant 
Lawsuit, and it raised the very same defenses as it raises here. In the Diamant Lawsuit, 
the arbitrator ruled that the named plaintiffs had cognizable claims against the County, 
and he awarded back pay and other benefits to those named Diamant plaintiffs who 
established an inequity under his formula. The back pay he awarded was for the period 
of May 1, 1990 through August 31, 1994. 
As the trial court correctly recognized, the same result should occur here. The 
Sworn Officers should have been included in the Diamant Lawsuit, and even though they 
were not (because the County excluded them after the fact) they are not required to 
relitigate the very same issues again. The County already lost, and it should not get 
another bite at the apple. Legal and equitable principles require that the County's 
numerous arguments be overruled, that the trial court's judgment be affirmed, and that 
the County finally be required to make the Sworn Officers whole. 
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